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1 
Once More Unto the Breach:1 An Analysis of Legal, Technological, and Policy Issues Involving 
Data Breach Notification Statutes  
 
Dana J. Lesemann2 
 
 
Companies facing the loss of a laptop or a compromised server have long waged battles on 
several fronts: investigating the source of the breach, identifying potentially criminal behavior, retrieving or 
replicating lost or manipulated data, and putting better security in place, to name a few generalized 
steps.  As recently as seven years ago, the broader consequences of a data breach were largely 
deflected from the party on whose resource the data resided and instead rested essentially on those 
whose data was compromised.  Today, however, with the patchwork quilt of domestic data breach 
statutes and penalties, most companies forging “unto the breach” would consider paying a ransom worthy 
of King Henry to avoid the loss of its consumers’ identities through theft or manipulation.   
 
The rise in the incidences of these breaches is well documented.  Reports of data breaches 
increased dramatically in 2008. The Identity Theft Resource Center reported 656 breaches in 2008, 
reflecting an increase of 47% over the previous year’s total of 446.3  A single vendor, Verizon, recently 
issued a report that analyzed 90 confirmed data breaches within its 2008 caseload, which encompassed 
285 million compromised records.4 
 
In confronting a data breach, a company has to contend with a multitude of issues: the costs of 
replacing lost equipment, repairing the breach and thwarting a potentially criminal act. Some specific 
industries have their own privacy laws.  For example, financial firms must contend with the reporting 
                                                 
1
  William Shakespeare, Henry V, Act III. 
2
  Managing Director and Deputy General Counsel, Stroz Friedberg and Adjunct Professor of Law, Howard 
University School of Law. Stroz Friedberg is a consulting and technical services firm specializing in digital forensics, 
network intrusion, data breach response, and cyber-security investigations. I am grateful to my colleagues at Stroz 
Friedberg for their assistance in developing this article, particularly the research of Steven Mecca and the expert 
editorial review of Miriam Birnbaum, Thomas Harris-Warrick, and Paul Luehr. Thanks also to Ahmed Baset, Howard 
University School of Law, Class of 2010.  All errors, of course, remain my own.   
3
  Identity Theft Resource Center, Report on Data Breaches 2008,  
http://www.idtheftcenter.org/artman2/publish/lib_survey/Breaches_2008.shtml 
4
  Verizon 2009 Data Breach Investigations Report, 
http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf, at 32. 
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requirements associated with the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,5 and health care companies face 
broad reporting requirements under the new HITECH Act.6  Across the broader economy, however, 
attorneys and companies worry most about a thicket of data breach notification statutes enacted by 45 
states and the District of Columbia.  These statutes expose law firms and their clients to conflicting time 
limits, reporting requirements, fines, and potentially millions of dollars in penalties and civil liability -- not to 
mention reputational risk.  The 46 data breach notification statutes vary widely from state to state and, 
most critically, focus not on the location of the breach or where the company is incorporated but on the 
residence of the victim.7  Therefore, a company facing a data breach must comply with the state laws of 
each of its affected consumers.  A company’s multi-state or Internet presence only extends the potential 
web of specific time limits and other often conflicting requirements for notifying consumers.   
 
This Article addresses the legal, technological, and policy issues surrounding U.S. data breach 
notification statutes and recommends steps that state and federal regulatory agencies should take to 
improve and harmonize those statutes.  Part I of this Article provides background on the data breaches 
that gave rise to the enactment of notification statutes. Part II addresses the varying definitions of 
“personal information” in the state statutes – the data that is protected by the statute and whose breach 
must be revealed to consumers.   Part III analyzes how states define the data breach itself, particularly 
whether states rely on a strict liability standard, on a risk assessment approach, or on a model that blends 
elements of both in determining how and when companies have to notify consumers of a breach.  Part IV 
discusses the time limits companies face, penalties for non-compliance, litigation under the statutes, and 
enforcement of the statutes by states.   Finally, Part V presents specific recommendations for the state 
legislatures and enforcement agencies and for Congress, as well as for companies facing data breaches.  
 
                                                 
5
  15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. 
6
  HITECH Act at §13402, codified at 42 U.S.C. §17932. 
7
  See infra at Part I. 





Data breach statute fever began in 2002 after a California state database, which contained the 
social security numbers and other personal information of more than 250,000 state employees, was 
compromised.  The breach was not discovered for a month and affected employees were not notified for 
several weeks after that.9  This breach – and the way it was handled -- led the California legislature to 
enact the country’s first data breach notification statute later that year.10  In February 2005, ChoicePoint, 
a commercial data broker, announced that it had unwittingly sold personal information regarding 145,000 
individuals to a group of people engaged in identity theft.11  The company later said the breach had 
actually occurred and been uncovered in September 2004, five months before ChoicePoint had alerted 
the victims in California pursuant to the California statute.  Then, significantly, victims in other states were 
not notified, since no legal mandate required notification.  This strict compliance with the letter of the law 
became a public relations nightmare for ChoicePoint when non-California victims found out they had been 
omitted from the notice. 
 
The Federal Trade Commission subsequently sued ChoicePoint for not having reasonable 
procedures to screen prospective subscribers, for turning over consumers’ sensitive personal information 
to subscribers whose applications raised obvious “red flags”, and for making false or misleading 
statements about its privacy practices.12  In 2006 ChoicePoint agreed to pay the FTC $10 million in civil 
penalties – a record amount – and agreed to make $5 million available to consumers in restitution.13 The 
                                                 
8
  The Privacy Law Blog maintained by Proskauer Rose LLP contains links to most of the statues cited here. 
See http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2007/08/articles/security-breach-notification-l/breach-law-data/#more.  Although 
Oklahoma enacted a data breach notification statute in 2006, its provisions apply only to state agencies, boards, 
commissions or other units or subdivisions of the state government.  See O.S. § 3113.1.  Because of the limited 
applicability of Oklahoma’s data breach statute, this article omits any discussion of its substantive provisions.  
9
  See, e.g., Anthony D. Milewski Jr., 2 Shidler J. L. Com. & Tech. 19 (Apr. 14, 2006), at 
http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a019Milewski.html and sources cited within.  
10
  Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.80 et seq. See also Milewski, supra.  
11
  See http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm 
12
  http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf 
13
  http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069stip.pdf,  
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm  
Under Publication Review -  Do Not Circulate or Cite Without Author’s Permission 
 
4 
following year the company settled with 44 state attorneys general to resolve allegations that ChoicePoint 
had failed to adequately maintain the privacy and security of consumers' personal information.14  
A flood of disclosures similar to ChoicePoint’s soon followed15 and in 2005 ten states enacted 
data breach notification statues.16 Seventeen states followed suit in 2006,17 another nine in 2007,18 five in 
2008,19 and three thus far in 2009,20 bringing the total number of states enacting data breach notification 
laws to 46.    
 
After ChoicePoint, each data breach notification statute passed by a state was designed to 
provide specific protection to that state’s residents. California’s statute, for example, provides that “[i]t is 
the intent of the legislature to ensure that personal information about California residents is protected.”21 
Similarly, the statute’s disclosure requirements are focused on California residents: 
 (a) Any person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses computerized 
data that includes personal information, shall disclose any breach of the security of the system following 
discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of California whose 
unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an 
unauthorized person.22  
  
The other 45 statutes also have focused on their own residents in enacting statutes that have varied 
requirements for investigating and disclosing data breaches, some with significant monetary penalties.23  
                                                 
14
  See http://www.naag.org/44_attorneys_general_reach_settlement_with_choicepoint.php The 44 states that 
participated in the settlement are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawai i ,  Idaho,  I l l i no is ,  Ind iana,  Iowa,  Ken tucky,  Louis iana,  Maine,  Maryland ,  
Massachuset ts ,  Mich igan,  Minnesota ,  Miss iss ipp i ,  Missour i ,  Montana,  Nebraska,  Nevada,  New 
Jersey,  New Mexico,  New York ,  North  Caro l ina,  North  Dakota,  Ohio,  Ok lahoma, Oregon,  
Pennsylvania,  South Dakota,  Tennessee,  Texas,  Vermont ,  Vi rg in ia ,  Washington,  W est  Vi rg in ia ,  
W iscons in and the Dis t r i c t  o f  Columbia.   
15
  See  “A Chronology of Data Breaches,” http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm 
16
  The 10 states to enact data breach notification statutes in 2005 were Arkansas, Georgia, North Dakota, 
Delaware, Florida, Tennessee, Washington, Texas, North Carolina, and New York. 
17
  The 17 states that enacted statutes in 2006 are Connecticut, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, new jersey,  
Maine, Ohio, Montana, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Idaho, Indiana, Nebraska, Colorado, Arizona. 
18
  In 2007 Hawaii, Kansas, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont, Michigan, District of Columbia, Wyoming, Oregon 
enacted data breach notification statutes.  
19
  Maryland, Massachusetts, West Virginia, Iowa, and Virginia enacted new data breach notification statutes 
and Oklahoma passed a substantial revision to its statute.  
20
  Alaska, Missouri, and South Carolina have passed data breach notification statutes thus far in 2009.  
21
  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5. 
22
  Cal. Civ. Code  § 1798.82(a). 
23
  See Alaska, Alaska Stat.  § 45.48.010; Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501(L)(4); Arkansas, §  4-110-
105(a)(1); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-716 (d)(I); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. § Sec. 36a-701b(b); 
Delaware, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, 12B-102 (a); District of Columbia, D.C. Code § 28-3852(a); Florida, Fla. Stat. § 
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Thus, under these statutes, it is the resident of the victim – and not the location of the company or the 
breach – that controls the notification requirements.  As a result, a company facing a data breach in which 
the victims are spread across the country – a near certainty today, especially with the Internet providing 
virtual locations across the globe – could face multiple, inconsistent requirements and harsh penalties for 
failing to comply.  
II. Personal Information Defined 
A. The California Model 
 
Most states have modeled their data breach statutes after California’s 2002 groundbreaking law.  
California’s statute requires notification to individuals if, as the result of a breach in a company’s computer 
security, an individual’s “personal information” is compromised.24  California’s initial statute defined 
“personal information” as a person’s first name or first initial and his or her last name in combination with 
any one or more of the following pieces of data, when either the name or the data elements are not 
encrypted or redacted:  
• Social Security Number 
• Driver’s license number or state identification card number 
• Account number, credit, or debit card number, in combination with any required security 
code, access code, or password that would permit access to an individual’s financial 
account. 25 
In 2007 California added two additional elements to the definition of personal information: 
                                                                                                                                                             
817.5681(1)(a); Georgia, Ga. Code. Ann. § 10-1-912; Hawaii, H.R.S. § 487N-2(a); Idaho, Idaho Code § 28-51-104(5), 
28-51-105; Illinois, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 530/10; Indiana, Ind. Code § 24-4.9-3-1; Iowa, §  715C.1-2; Kansas, Kan. 
Stat. Ann. § 50-7a02(a); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51: 3074(a); Maryland, Md. Code Ann. §14-3502(A); Massachusetts, 
Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 3; Michigan, Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § 325E.61, Subdiv. 1; 
Missouri, 407.1500. 2; Montana, Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-1704 (1); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-803; Nevada, 
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.220; New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:19 (V); New Jersey, N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8-
163(12)(a); New York, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 899-aa.2; North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. §75-65; North Dakota, N.D. 
Cent. Code § 51-30-02; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.19(A)(1)(a); Oklahoma, 2008 H.B. 2245(a); Oregon, Or. 
Rev. Stat. Section 2(2); Pennsylvania, 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. Section 2; Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws, § 11-49.2-3; South 
Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 39-1-90; Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. 47-18-2107(b); Texas, Tex. Bus & Com. Code 
Ann. § 48.103(b); Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 13-44-202(1)(a); Vermont, 9 V.S.A. § 2430(2); Virginia, S.B. 307; Wash. 
Rev. Code § 19.255.010(1); West Virginia, W. Va. Code §46A-2A-101(6); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 895.507; Wyoming, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. 40-12-501 (a)(1).  
24
  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(e), 
25
  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(e).  
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• Medical information 
• Health insurance information.26 
These amendments became effective January 1, 2008.  In California, as in all except three states with 
data breach notification statutes, “personal information” is defined to exclude information that is  publicly 
available.27  
B. Other State Variations 
  
Some states include additional elements in the definition of “personal information” beyond the 
California model.  For example, the Iowa,28 Nebraska, 29 and Wisconsin30 data breach notification statutes 
include unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, retina, or iris images in the definition.  North Carolina31 
and North Dakota32 expand on the California model to include an employee’s digital signatures. 
New York takes a different approach.  The statute simply -- and sweepingly -- defines personal 
information as “any information concerning a natural person which, because of name, number, symbol, 
mark or other identifier, can be used to identify that natural person,” plus the individual’s social security 
number, driver’s license number (or non-driver identification card number), account number, credit or 
debit card number, PIN, or other necessary code.33 (emphasis added) 
It is also worth noting that the data breach statutes in Alaska,34 Hawaii,35 Indiana,36 North 
Carolina,37 Massachusetts,38 and Wisconsin39 include a breach of written as well as electronic data within 
the scope of their laws.  
                                                 
26
  California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, A.B. 1298.  
27
  The three states that do not exclude publicly available information from the definition of personal information 
are Michigan, Montana and Rhode Island.   
28
  Iowa Code § 715C.1(11). 
29
  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-802(5). 
30
  Wis. Stat. § 895.507(5).  
31
  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65. 
32
  N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-01(2)(a). 
33
  N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law. §899-aa(1)(a)-(b). 
34
  Alaska Stat § 45.48.090(1).  
35
  H.R.S. § 487N-1.  
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III. Defining a Data Breach  
 
The 46 statutes define a “data breach” on a continuum from a strict liability standard to a risk-
based approach.  Some states define a breach simply as the “compromise” of a system,40 whereas others 
incorporate into the definition the extent to which the data is likely to be misused and, in some cases, the 
likelihood that the misuse will lead to injury of the consumers.41  In some cases the definitions incorporate 
a requirement that the companies investigate where the risk of harm is unknown. 
 
Some statutes require that companies notify consumers based solely on “unauthorized access” to 
consumers’ personal information or “compromise” of personal information, whether or not the access to or 
compromise of that information results in fraud, crime, or any injury to the consumer.  Because of the lack 
of demonstrated risk, injury, or possibility of injury, this can be referred to as a form of “strict liability” 
notification.  At the other end of the scale is the risk assessment model, in which notice is required if the 
unauthorized acquisition creates a risk of harm to the consumer.   
A. The Strict Liability Model 
 
Under the strict liability model, companies are not required to perform a risk assessment and 
must provide notice whether or not there has been an actual injury to consumers.  Typically, the language 
found in this type of data breach notification statute is a requirement that companies must notify 
consumers on the basis of unauthorized access to or the compromise of personal information.  North 
Dakota defines a security breach in the broadest possible terms, as the “unauthorized access to” or 
                                                                                                                                                             
36
  Ind. Code § 24-4.9-2-2 (2)(a). 
37
  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65(a). 
38
  Mass. Gen. Laws., § 93H 1(a). 
39
  See Wis. Stat. § 895.507(b).  In fact, Wisconsin’s data breach statute never mention electronic data or 
computer systems, but requires an organization to notify all consumers – not merely Wisconsin residents – if it 
becomes aware that that someone has acquired personal information without authorization to do so.  See Wis. Stat. § 
895 507(2). 
40
  See discussion infra at Section III.A 
41
  See discussion infra at Section III.B.  
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“acquisition of” computerized data; notification is required whether or not the unauthorized access or 
acquisition of computerized data results in the compromise of personal information.42   
 
California’s data breach notification statute defines a breach of the security system as an 
“unauthorized acquisition” of data that “compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal 
information.”43  This type of statute requires notification in nearly all cases where unencrypted sensitive 
personal data is reasonably believed to have been acquired, whether or not there is any injury to the 
consumer.44  Eight states—Delaware,45 Georgia,46 Illinois,47 Minnesota,48 North Dakota,49 Texas,50 Utah,51 
and Washington,52 -- as well as the District of Columbia53 follow this strict liability model.     
 
Six of these states—Arizona,54 Florida,55 Idaho,56 Nevada,57 Oregon,58 and Tennessee59—
incorporate an element of “materiality” into the definition of a “breach of the security system.”  Florida, for 
example, defines a data breach as an “unauthorized acquisition” of data that “materially compromises the 
                                                 
42
  N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-01 (1).  
43
  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(d).  A standard provision found in the California Code and in the other data 
breach notification statutes is an exemption for the good faith acquisition of personal information by an employee or 
agent of the person, which is considered not to be a breach of the security of the system, provided the information is 
not used for a purpose unrelated to the business or subject to further unauthorized use.  See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code. § 
1798.82(d).  
44
  See GAO Report to Congressional Requestors, Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, but 
Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft is Limited; However, the Full Extent is Unknown, GAO-07-737 (June 2007), at 
37. 
45
  Del. Code Ann. Tit 6, § 12B-101(a). 
46
  See Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-911(1). 
47
  See 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/5. 
48
  See Minn. Stat. § 325E.61, Subdiv. 1(d). 
49
  See N.D. Cent. Code § 51-30-02. 
50
  See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 48.103. 
51
  See Utah Code Ann. § 13-44-102(1)(a). 
52
  See Wash. Rev. Code § 19.255.010(4). 
53
  See D.C. Code § 28-3851(1). 
54
  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501 
55
  Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(4). 
56
  Idaho Code § 28-51-104(2). 
57
  Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.020. 
58
  Or. Rev. Stat. § 646A. 602(1)(a). 
59
  Tenn. Code. Ann. 47-18-2107(b). 
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security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information.” 60 (emphasis added) None of these states, 
however, defines a “material breach” or otherwise provides clarity as to what constitutes a breach that 
“materially compromises” personal information.  Moreover, the relative gravity or “materiality” of a breach 
is not a function of the number of records or individuals whose personal information is compromised or 
whether any actual injury has occurred, but rather whether any compromised record contains personally 
identifiable information (PII).  Thus, a breach of a system that contains “personal information” appears to 
be a prima facie occurrence of a “material” breach.61  For example, if an ex-boyfriend who hacks into a 
computer system and targets the personal information of only one person -- his former girlfriend, he has 
effected a “material breach” of that system.  As a result, although these statutes might initially appear to 
constitute a more relaxed standard, they too create a form of strict liability for companies facing a data 
breach.   
 
Two of these states -- Arizona62 and Idaho63 -- also require companies to undertake a reasonable 
investigation to determine whether there has been a security breach.  However, neither statute provides 
detail on what steps satisfy the requirements for a “reasonable” investigation.    
B. The Risk Assessment Model   
 
In contrast to those states that require companies to notify consumers on the basis of 
unauthorized access or the compromise of personal information, ___ states require companies to provide 
notice only if the unauthorized acquisition creates a risk of harm to the consumer.  The states that have 
adopted this risk assessment model have done so using different approaches.   
 
Six of these states -- Kansas,64 Maine,65 Nebraska,66 New Hampshire,67 Utah,68 and Wyoming69 -- 
                                                 
60
  Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(4) (emphasis added).  
61
  See Eric Friedberg and Michael McGowan, “Lost Back-Up Tapes, Stolen Laptops and Other Tales of Data 
Breach Woe,” The Computer & Internet Lawyer (Oct. 2006). 
62
  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501. 
63
  Idaho Code §§ 28-51-105. 
64
  Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 70-7102. 
65
  10 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1348. 
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also require companies to determine whether there has been a misuse of individuals’ information.    As 
with Idaho and Arizona, these statues do not provide detail on what steps satisfy the requirements for a 
“reasonable” investigation.  New Hampshire, for example, requires an entity to “immediately determine” 
whether or not misuse of individuals’ personal information has occurred.  These statutes do not indicate 
whether notice needs to be given if there is no indication that there has been financial injury.  
Nevertheless, companies should be ready to demonstrate their reasonableness by documenting the 
steps they take, the relevant expertise of the personnel performing the investigation, and adequately and 
thoroughly report the relevant findings to appropriate senior management and/or government agencies.  
In short, a company that investigates whether a data breach has or will lead to consumer injury needs to 
be ready to “show its work” and report what it did to make that assessment.  
 
Another group of states provides that if a business undertakes an “appropriate” investigation or 
consults with relevant federal, state, and local law enforcement, and “reasonably” determines that the 
breach has not — and likely will not — result in harm to the individuals whose personal information has 
been acquired and accessed, it need not notify those individuals.  These types of provisions are found in 
the data breach statutes of Alaska,70 Arkansas,71 Florida,72 Iowa, 73 Rhode Island,74 and Vermont.75  
These states require businesses to document their findings in writing and maintain the documentation for 
a stated number of years. In Florida, for example, companies face a fine of up to $50,000 for failure to 
create and maintain proper documentation should they choose not to provide notice following a breach.76  
Although companies in these ten states are not required to conduct an investigation, the laws encourage 
them to do so. The statutes also provide incentives for companies to notify federal, state, and local law 
                                                                                                                                                             
66
  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-803(1). 
67
   N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:20 I(a). 
68
  Utah Code Ann. §§13-44-102 b, 202. 
69
  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 40-12-501(a). 
70
  Alaska Stat. §45.48.010(c). 
71
  Ark. Code Ann. § 1167, § 4-110-105(d).  
72
  Fla. Stat. § 5681(10)(a)  
73
  Iowa Code § 715C.1(6).  
74
  R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-49.2-4. 
75
  V.S.A. § 435(d)(1). 
76
  Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(10)(a) – (b). 
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enforcement of the breach, providing investigators and prosecutors with the opportunity to assess the 
nature and extent of the compromise and focus their limited resources on the investigations that are the 
highest priority.  
 
Fifteen states -- Hawaii,77 Iowa,78 Indiana,79 Kansas,80 Massachusetts,81 Montana,82 New York,83 
North Carolina,84 Ohio,85 Oklahoma,86 Pennsylvania,87 South Carolina,88 Virginia,89 West Virginia90 and -- 
define a “security breach” in terms of whether it leads to a risk of injury to the consumer. Although these 
statutes do not explicitly require a company to conduct an investigation into a breach, such a 
determination probably requires such a review. Massachusetts, for example, defines “breach of the 
security system” as:  
the unauthorized acquisition or unauthorized use of unencrypted data or, encrypted electronic 
data and the confidential process or key that is capable of compromising the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information, maintained by a person or agency that creates 
a substantial risk of identity theft or fraud against a resident of the commonwealth.91  
 
New York alone lists specific factors that an organization may consider in determining whether 
consumers’ personal information has been acquired or is reasonably believed to have been acquired by 
an unauthorized individual, including indications (1) that the information is in the physical possession and 
control of an unauthorized person, such as a lost or stolen computer or other device; (2) that the 
information has been downloaded or copied; or (3) that the information was used by an unauthorized 
person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or instances of identity theft.92 Michigan notes simply that 
“[i]n determining whether a security breach is not likely to cause substantial loss or injury to, or result in 
identity theft,” a person or agency shall act with the care an ordinarily prudent person or agency in like 
                                                 
77
  H.R.S. § 487N -1. 
78
  Iowa Code § 715C.1(6). 
79
  Ind. Code § 24-4.9-2-2. 
80
  Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-7°01-02 
81
  Mass. Gen. Laws 93H§ 1(G).  
82
  Mont. Code. Ann. § 30-14-1704(4)(a).  
83
  N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 899-aa(c). 
84
  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-61(14). 
85
  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.19(A). 
86
  74 Okla. Stat. 3113.3. 
87
  73 Pa. Stat. Ann., § 2302(a). 
88
  S.C. Code Ann. § 37-20-110(15).   
89
   Va. Code 18.2.-186.6(A). 
90
  W. Va. Code § 46A-2A-101(1).  
91
  Mass. Gen. Laws 93H§ 1(G). 
92
  N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 899-aa(c). 
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position would exercise under similar circumstances.93   
  
C. Blending Definitions: Risk Assessment and Strict Liability 
 
Some state data breach notification statutes incorporate both risk assessment and strict liability 
clauses.  These statutes generally start with the premise that a company must disclose a breach. They 
then typically incorporate a clawback provision stating that notification will not be required if the company 
undertakes an “appropriate investigation,” consults with federal, state, and local law enforcement 
agencies, and determines that the breach likely will not result in harm to the individuals whose personal 
information has been acquired and accessed. Connecticut’s statute is typical: 
Any person . . . shall disclose any breach of security following the discovery of the breach to any 
resident of this state whose personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, 
accessed by an unauthorized person through such breach of security.  
 
. . .  
 
Such notification shall not be required if, after an appropriate investigation and consultation with 
relevant federal, state and local agencies responsible for law enforcement, the person reasonably 
determines that the breach will not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal 
information has been acquired and accessed. 94   
 
There are similar provisions in the data breach notification statutes of Colorado, 95 Maryland,96 Michigan,97 
Missouri,98 New Jersey,99 Oregon,100 and Vermont,101 
 
 In a few states, a blend of definitions has created internal contradictions. North Carolina defines a 
security breach both as “unauthorized access to and acquisition of unencrypted and unredacted records 
or data containing personal information where illegal use of the personal information has occurred or is 
reasonably likely to occur or that creates a material risk of harm to a consumer.” The statute then adds: 
“Any incident of unauthorized access to and acquisition of encrypted records or data containing personal 
                                                 
93
  Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72(12). 
94
  Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-701(b). 
95
  Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-716. 
96
  Md. Code Ann. § 14-3504(B)(3). 
97
  Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72(12)(1).  
98
  Mo. H.B. No. 62, § 407.1500.2(5).  
99
  N.J. Stat. Ann. § C.56:8-163. 
100
  Or. Rev. Stat. § 646A.602. 
101
  V.S.A. § 435(d)(1). 
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information along with the confidential process or key shall constitute a security breach.” These two 
standards are in conflict.  The first clause includes a risk-based analysis into whether there has been 
actual illegal use of data or some other “material risk of harm.”  The second clause imposes strict liability 
for a mere “incident of unauthorized access” to personal information, regardless of whether there is a risk 
of injury to consumers.102  
 
Similarly, Massachusetts’ data breach statute incorporates two different standards, the first of 
which is risk-based and the second of which creates a strict liability standard.  First, the statute requires 
an organization to notify the Commonwealth’s residents if it knows or has reason to know of a breach of 
security.  A breach is defined as “the unauthorized acquisition or unauthorized use of unencrypted data, 
or encrypted electronic data and the confidential process or key that is capable of compromising the 
security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information that creates a substantial risk of identity theft 
or fraud against a resident of the Commonwealth”.103  In addition, however, a company must also provide 
notice if it knows or has reason to know that the personal information of such a resident was acquired or 
used by an unauthorized person or used for an unauthorized person.104  
D. Conducting the Investigation  
 
California’s landmark statute, enacted in the wake of data breaches in 2002, requires companies 
to notify consumers “in the most expedient time possible and without unnecessary delay, consistent with 
the needs of law enforcement  . . . or any measures to determine the scope of the breach and restore the 
reasonable integrity of the data system.”105  The states that followed California in enacting data breach 
notification statutes encouraged or required companies, in various ways, to investigate data breaches.  
As discussed above, some states encouraged companies to conduct an “appropriate investigation” and 
consult with law enforcement, incorporating a provision that notification would not be required if the 
investigation resulted in a determination that consumers had not been injured.106   Other state statutes 
included requirements that companies undertake their own investigations and report their findings to law 
                                                 
102
  N. C. Gen. Stat. § 75-61(14). 
103
  Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 3(a). 
104
  Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 3(a). 
105
  Calif. Civ. Code. § 1798.82(a).  
106
  See supra III.C. 
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enforcement or a regulatory authority.107   
 
The focus of the investigation varies depending on whether there is a strict liability to report or a 
need to report based on a finding of substantial risk.  In strict liability states like North Dakota the 
investigation focuses on whether consumer’s personal information has simply been acquired and 
accessed.108  In states that focus on substantial risk of injury like Massachusetts, 109 the focus of the 
investigation is on whether the consumers had been injured by fraud or identity theft.  
 
No statute actually defines the scope of an “adequate investigation”, details what steps a 
company must take, or prescribes how a company should document the results of its investigation.   
However, there are a number of questions a company should be able to answer in order to determine 
what data was exposed and who was involved in the data breach: 
• Where was the compromised stolen information stored? 
• How was this information accessed, when, and by whom? 
• What did the perpetrators do with the data? Did they extract it? If so, how and what did 
they do with it?  
• With whom did the perpetrators communicate about the stolen data, both within and 
outside the organization?110  
 
A digital forensic examiner can take the necessary steps to preserve the evidence in a 
forensically sound manner to ensure that nothing crucial to the investigation is altered or obliterated.  
Something as simple as changing the “last accessed” dates on the compromised computer system may 
make it impossible to ascertain whether an intruder gained unauthorized access to the data at issue.   
Even if evidence of illegal activity is found, failures to handle digital evidence in a forensically sound 
manner can prevent an organization from taking legal action against the culprit or making a successful 
                                                 
107
  See supra III.B. 
108
  N.D. Cent. Code §§ 51-30-02.   
109
  Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 1(G).  
110
 See Eoghan Casey, “Data Theft: An Ounce of Forensic Preparedness is Worth a Pound of Incident Response,” 
ISSA Journal (Aug. 2007).  
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criminal referral to law enforcement.   
 
 On a practical level, there could be a real or perceived threat to the jobs of the local IT staff, 
which creates a potential conflict of interest and an incentive not to disclose all of the circumstances 
surrounding the breach.  Often an internal IT group may be hesitant to admit that a breach was caused by 
an internal security weakness because they fear that any blame for the vulnerability leading to the breach 
will be placed at their feet.  In fact, IT personnel may even be concerned that they could be viewed as 
complicit suspects in the data compromise.  For example, if a company discovers that customer sales 
data may have been copied illicitly from a shared file server, members of the IT department might be 
reluctant to conduct a thorough investigation if they fear being held responsible for failing to secure the 
file server, or if they fear that they will be viewed as suspects because they are among the few individuals 
who have administrative rights to the file server.  
  
In short, independent digital forensic examiners can be an important part of the successful 
investigation of a data breach. When confronting the issue of how to conduct an “appropriate” 
investigation and prepare documentation that supports any resulting findings, a company would be wise 
to consider the services of digital forensic examiners, much as they would consider the services of 
outside counsel well-versed in privacy and data breach law.   
 
E. Safe Harbor under Federal Banking Statutes and Other Laws 
 
Most of the state data breach statutes provide exemptions for firms already governed by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 or, alternatively, for procedures that are enacted pursuant to 
other state or federal rules or regulations.111  These exemptions arise from the fact that these other 
                                                 
111
  See Alaska, Alaska Stat. § 45.48.040(c); Arizona, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501(J)(1); Arkansas, Ark. Rev. 
Stat. § 4-110-106(a); California, Cal. Civ. Code § 4-110-106(5); Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-716(2); Connecticut, 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-701(f); Delaware, Del. Code. Ann. Tit. 6, § 12B-103(b); D.C., D.C. Code § 28-3852(g); 
Florida, Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(9)(b); Hawaii, H.R.S. § 487N-2(g); Idaho, Idaho Code § 28-51-106(2); Indiana, Indiana 
Code § 24-4.9-3-3.5; Iowa, Iowa Code § 715C.2(7)(C); Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-7a02(e); Maine, 10 Me. Rev. 
Stat. §1349(4); Maryland, Md. Code Ann. Code Ann. §14–3507(c); Mass. Gen. Laws 93H § 5; Michigan, Mich. Comp. 
Laws, §445.72(8)(b); Minnesota, Minn, Stat. § 325E.61, Subdiv. 4; Missouri, H.B 62 § 407.1500. 3; Montana, Mont. 
Code Ann. § 30-14-1702(8)(b); Nebraska, Neb. Rev Stat. §87-804; Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.040(5)(a); New 
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statutes have their own reporting requirements and privacy protections.  For example, Congress enacted 
the GLBA to ensure that financial service providers would protect consumers' personal financial 
information.  Under the Act, financial institutions must develop and implement data security policies that 
“prevent the unauthorized disclosure of customer financial information and to deter and detect fraudulent 
access to such information.”  Under the guidance issued pursuant to the GLBA, a financial institution that 
becomes aware of unauthorized access to personal information should conduct a reasonable 
investigation promptly to determine the likelihood that the information has been or will be misused.  If the 
company determines that misuse of the information has occurred or is reasonably possible, it is supposed 
to notify affected consumers as soon as possible.112  
F. Recommendation:  States Should Adopt the Risk Assessment Model which Presents 
Greater Benefits for the Consumer over the Strict Liability Approach 
 
A strict liability regime sets a hair trigger for data breach notification.  Companies send out letters 
to consumers even when there is no evidence of injury, risk of injury, or possibility of injury, but merely 
when there is evidence that “access to” consumers’ PII occurred.  As a result, consumers receive so 
many data breach notification letters that they become numb to the effect. 113  The form letters sent to 
consumers generally provide them with no information about actual injury or risk, nor do they provide 
consumers with the ability to judge whether there is any likelihood of injury or risk.  
 
Adopting a risk assessment model is a more efficient approach.  States and the federal 
government should exempt companies from the obligation to notify individuals of a data breach if the 
companies (1) undertake an appropriate investigation and “reasonably” determine that the breach has 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:19(V); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65(h); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. 
Code § 51-30-06; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1349.19(F)(1); Oklahoma, 74 Okla. Stat. § 3113.1; Oregon, Or. Rev. 
Stat. § 646A.602(8)(c); Pennsylvania, 73 Pa. Stat. Annot. § 7307(b); Rhode Island, R.I. Gen. Laws, § 11-49.2-7; 
South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 39-1-90(J); Tennessee, Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-2107(i); Utah, Utah Code Ann. 
§13-44-202(5)(c); Vermont, 9 V.S.A. §2435(f); Virginia, Virginia Code Ann. § 18.2-186.6(A); West Virginia, W. Va. 
Code §46A-2A-102(f); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. §134.98(3m); Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann § 40-12-502(c). 
112
  See 12 C.F.R. Pt. 30, App. B., Supp. A. III(A); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 208, App. D-2, Supp. A. § III(A); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 
225, App. F, Supp. A § III(a); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 364, App. B, Supp. A, § III(A); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 570, App. B, Supp.  § IIII(A); 
and 12 C.F.R. Pt. 748, App. B § III(A). See also “Personal Information: Data Breaches Are Frequent, But Evidence of 
Resulting Identity Theft is Limited; However, the Full Extent is Unknown, GAO Report to Congressional Requesters,” 
GAO-07-737 (June 2007).  
113
  See Schwartz and Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 913 Mich. L. Rev. 916 (2007) (arguing for 
determination of data security breaches and post-notification remediation by an independent third party).  
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not—and likely will not—result in harm to the individuals whose PII has been acquired and accessed, 
document those results, and maintain them for at least five years; and (2) consult with relevant federal, 
state, or local law enforcement regarding their determination that the breach has not—and likely will not—
result in harm to the individuals whose PII has been acquired and accessed.  Requiring companies to 
undertake a thorough investigation will protect consumers; directing them to liaise with law enforcement 
regarding a breach would provide investigators with the information they need and allow for increased 
coordination of efforts. The proposal would require federal, state and local law enforcement to share 
information they receive from companies that had suffered data breaches; the risk is that government 
agencies would find themselves so inundated with information they would be unable to separate the 
wheat from the chaff. 
 
IV. When Time Limits Are Not Really Time Limits 
 
Several states have enacted what appear to be stringent time limits on notification of data 
breaches to consumers.  In reality, these purported time limits have several elements that toll or, in some 
cases nullify, the requirements written into these statutes. For example, Florida’s data breach notification 
statute states that, absent an investigation or the involvement of law enforcement and the reasonable 
determination of no harm, Florida organizations suffering a material breach must notify the affected 
individuals in writing, by email or through substituted notice114 “without unreasonable delay, consistent 
with the legitimate needs of law enforcement . . . or subject to any measures necessary to determine the 
presence, nature and scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the system. Notification 
must be made no later than 45 days following the determination of the breach unless otherwise provided 
in this section.”115 (emphasis added) 
 
The statute appears to require quick action based on two complementary guidelines regarding 
when notice must be issued. Specifically, the notice must be made “without unreasonable delay” but, in 
any event, not later than 45-days after there is a “determination of a breach.”116   In fact, the 45-day 
                                                 
114
  Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(6). 
115
  Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(1)(a).  
116
  Id. 
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countdown to provide notice is subject to either tolling or nullification under several circumstances. First, 
the 45-day countdown is tolled when the victimized company begins taking “measures necessary to 
determine the presence, nature, and scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the 
system.”117 These measures may take a substantial period of time and no outside time limit is specified in 
the statute.  Second, the 45-day countdown for notice is nullified and no notification is required under 
Florida law if, after a reasonable investigation, the company determines that the breach has not and will 
not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal information has been acquired and accessed.118  
 
 
 Only the data breach statutes in Ohio119 and Wisconsin120 replicate the 45-day limits found in 
Florida’s data breach statute.  Ohio’s statute makes the rigorous time constraints “subject to the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement, and consistent with any measures necessary to determine the scope of the 
breach, including which residents’ personal information was accessed and acquired, and to restore the 
reasonable integrity of the data system.”121 (emphasis added)   However, the conjunctive between these 
two clauses means that companies in Ohio need to coordinate with law enforcement from the onset of the 
investigation of a data breach to ensure that the 45-day notification requirement is tolled.  Wisconsin’s 
statute, in contrast, posits that the only law enforcement exceptions to the 45-day rule must be related to 
the protection of an investigation or to homeland security.122 
 
Another group of 30 states require a company to provide notice in the “most expedient time 
possible,”  “without unreasonable delay” or “as soon as possible.”123  In the seven states that require 
                                                 
117
  Id. 
118
  See Fla. Stat. § 817.5681(10)(a).  
119
  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.9(B)(2) (emphasis added) 
120
  Wis. Stat. § 895. 507(3). 
121
  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.9(B)(2). 
122
  Wis. Stat. § 895.507(3). 
123
  The 30 states that require a company to provide notice in the “most expedient time possible” and “without 
unreasonable delay” or “as soon as possible” are Alaska, see Alaska Stat. § 45.48.010; Arkansas, see Ark. Code 
Ann. § 4-110-105(d); California, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1798,82(a); Colorado, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6176(2); 
Connecticut, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 36a-701b(b); Delaware, see Del. Code Ann. Tit 6, 12B-102(a); District of 
Columbia, see D.C. Code § 28-3852(a); Georgia, see Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-912(a); Hawaii, see H.R.S. § 487N-2; 
Illinois, see 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530/10(a); Indiana, see Ind. Code § 24-4.9-3-3; Louisiana, see La. Rev. Stat. § 
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companies to undertake investigations, companies generally must first conduct a “reasonable and 
prompt” investigation to determine the likelihood that personal information has been or will be misused; if 
so, they must then provide notice in the most expedient time possible.124 
A. Penalties 
 
Consumers in California,125 Hawaii,126 New Hampshire,127 North Carolina,128 Washington129 and 
the District of Columbia130 have an explicit private right of action under their state data breach statutes.  
Companies that do not comply with the statute face civil penalties ranging from $500 a violation in 
Maine131 to a maximum of $750,000 in Michigan,132 and a range of penalties in between.133  In 26 states 
the attorney general may institute suit for actual damages or injunctive relief against organizations or 
individuals that violate the data breach statute.134  
                                                                                                                                                             
51:3074; Massachusetts, Mass Gen. Laws 93H §3; Michigan; see Mich. Comp. Laws.  § 445.72(12)(4); Minnesota, 
see Minn. Stat. § 325E.61, Subdiv. 1(a); Missouri, H.B. No. 62, 407.1500.2(3);  Montana, see Mont. Code Ann. § 30-
14-1704(1); Nevada, see Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.220(1); New Jersey, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-163(12)(a); New 
York, see N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 899-aa(2); North Carolina, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65; North Dakota, see N.D. 
Cent. Code § 51-30-02; Oklahoma, 74 Okla. Stat. § 3113(3); Oregon,  Or. Rev. Stat.§ 646A.604; Pennsylvania, see 
73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2303(a); Rhode Island, see R.I. Gen. Laws, § 11-49.2-3; Tennessee, see Tenn. Code Ann., § 47-
18-2107(d); Texas, see Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 48.103(b); Utah, see Utah Code Ann. 13-44-202(2); Vermont, 
see V.S.A.. Tit. 9 § 2435(b)(1); Washington, see Wash. Rev. Code § 19.255.010(1). 
124
 The seven states in which states first must conduct a “reasonable and prompt” investigation are Arizon, Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. § 44-7501; Idaho, Idaho Code §§ 28-51-105; Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 70-7102; Maine, 10 Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 1348; Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-803(1); New Hampshire, N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:20 I(a); 
Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 40-12-501(a). 
 
125
  See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.84. 
126
  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.84. 
127
  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 359-C:21. 
128
  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-65-(i). 
129
  Wash. Rev. Code. § 19.255(10)(a). 
130
  D.C. Code § 28-3853(a). 
131
  10 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1349.2. 
132
  Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.72(13)-(14). 
133
  In Arizona, companies face civil penalties up to $10,000, see Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-7501(H); in Hawaii, civil 
penalties up to $2,500 for each violation, see H.R.S.§ 487N -3; Idaho, fines of up to $25,000 per breach, see Idaho 
Code § 28-51-107; Indiana, civil penalties up to $150,000 per deceptive act; see Ind. Code § 24-4.9-4-2.  
134
  The 26 jurisdictions in which state Attorneys General have authority to bring suits for damages or injunctive 
relief are Alaska, Alaska Code §45.48.080(a), Arkansas, Ark. Code Ann. § 4-109-108; Colorado, Colo. Rev. Stat. 
Stat. § 6176(4); Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. 36a-701b(g); Delaware, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 6, § 12B-106; Illinois, 815 
ILCS 530/20; Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-7a02(g); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 3075; Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann., Tit. 10 § 1349.2; Iowa, Iowa Code § 715C.2(8); Maryland, Md. Code; Ann. § 14-3508; Massachusetts, Mass. 
Gen. Laws. Ch. 93H, § 6; Minnesota, Minn. Stat. § Subdiv. 6; Missouri, Mo. H.B. No. 62, § 407.1500.4; Nebraska, 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 87-806; Nevada, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 603A.920; New Jersey, C.56:8-166; North Carolina, N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 75-65(i); North Dakota, N.D. Cent. Code § 51-03-07; Ohio, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1349.19(I); Oklahoma, 74 
Okla. Stat. § 3113.3 Pennsylvania, 73 Pa. Stat. Annot. 2309; Tennessee, Tenn. Code An., 47-18-2106; Texas, Tex. 
Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 48.201; Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 14-44-301(4); Vermont, V.S.A § 2435(g), Virginia, 18.2-
186.6; West Virginia, W. Va. Code § 46A-2A-104; Wyoming, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 40-12-502(f). 
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B. Enforcement and Litigation Under the Data Breach Statutes  
 
In the first five years after the first data breach statute was passed in California in 2002, there 
were relatively few state or federal complaints filed under the data breach notification statutes, especially 
in light of the number of data breaches reported.  The early suits arising out of the data breaches were 
focused on contract or tort rather than violation of the data breach notification statutes themselves.  For 
example, the Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General led a multi-state investigation into the security 
breach reported by the TJX Companies, the parent company of TJ Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods, and 
A.J. Wright stores.  The FTC filed suit as well, alleging that TJX failed to prevent unauthorized access to 
personal information on its computer networks and that these failures allowed a hacker to exploit 
vulnerabilities and obtain tens of millions of credit and debit payment cards used at the retailer’s stores, 
as well as personal information relating to approximately 455,000 consumers who returned merchandise 
without receipts.135  The TJX breach affected information regarding credit and debit card sales 
transactions in TJX’s stores in the United States, Canada and Puerto Rico during 2003, as well as such 
information for these stores from mid-May through December 2006.136  TJX also faced numerous 
individual and class action suits filed by consumers across the country.137  Both the private litigation and 
the public enforcement actions were focused on claims arising under TJX’s failure to protect consumers’ 
personally identifiable information; there were no claims that the company had failed to notify the victims 
upon the discovery of the breach.   
 
In June 2009 TJX settled with the multi-state group of attorneys general and agreed to pay $9.75 
million to the states, $5.5 million of which is to be dedicated to data protection and consumer protection 








  The actions filed against TJX, the parent company of TJ Maxx, include Robinson v. TJX Companies, Inc., et 
al., 07-cv-02139 (N.D. Ill.); Arians, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-10769 (D. Mass.); Massachusetts 
Bankers Ass’n, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-10791 (D. Mass.); Wardrop v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 
07-cv-00430 (W.D. Mich); Taliaferro, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-00388 (S.D. Ohio); Lack, et al. v. TJX 
Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-00233 (E.D. Tex.); Lamb, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-00379 (W.D. Mo.); 
Roberts, et al. v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., 07-cv-02887 (N.D. Ill.); and Mace v. TJX Companies, Inc., et al., (D. 
Mass.), which has been administratively designated as the lead case with respect to all actions pending in the District 
of Massachusetts, which have been consolidated.  
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efforts by the states and $1.75 million is for reimbursement of the states' costs and fees.  The remaining 
$2.5 million of the settlement will fund a Data Security Trust that will be used by the state attorneys 
general for policy efforts in the field of data security and protecting consumers' personal information.138  
The company's settlement with the FTC requires that it establish and maintain a comprehensive security 
program reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information 
it collects from or about consumers.139 To settle the class action suits, TJX offered vouchers, cash, credit 
monitoring, identity theft insurance, and reimbursement to eligible class members.140  
 
However, starting in 2008 a number of recent large breaches have spawned suits under data 
breach statutes in federal courts around the country as well as an increasing number of actions by state 
attorneys general.  The data breach at Countrywide Financial, the holding company for Countrywide 
Home Loans, has thus far given rise to six class actions filed in federal district courts across the country. 
One of the six was filed in the Southern District of Florida and alleges a violation of the Florida data 
breach notification statute.141  The United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the 
six cases and transferred them to the Western District of Kentucky for pretrial proceedings.142 In addition, 
the Connecticut Attorney General announced in September 2008 that as part of its ongoing investigation 
it was seeking more details about the threat to Connecticut consumers, confirmation that the company 
would provide free credit monitoring and freezes, and a guarantee that consumers would be 
compensated for losses associated with the breach.143  
 
 In 2007 the New York Attorney General's Office announced a settlement with CS Stars LLC, a 
Chicago-based claims management company for failing to notify 540,000 New York consumers for seven 
weeks after a breach in 2006 in contravention of the statute's requirement that notice be made 
“immediately following discovery.”  The company agreed to comply with the law, ensure that proper 








  Goldman v. Countrywide Financial Corp., et al., 2008 WL 4236995,  (S.D.Fla. Aug 22, 2008), Class Action 
Complaint with Injunctive Relief Sought and Demand for Jury Trial (NO. 08-61349). 
142
  In Re Countrywide Financial Corp. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, MDL No. 1998 (Dec. 2, 2008).   
143
 http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2795&Q=422688 
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notifications be made in the event of the future, implement more extensive practices relating to the 
security of private information and pay the Attorney General's office $60,000 for costs related to the 
investigation.144  
 
 In the wake of the Heartland Payment Systems breach of 2009, plaintiffs seeking class action 
status have filed suit alleging contract violations as well as failure to promptly notify consumers of the 
data breach in violation of New Jersey law.145  The plaintiffs in the Express Scripts class action cited 11 
data breach notification statutes, noting that Missouri, the home of the St. Louis-based pharmacy benefit 
management company that suffered the breach did not then have such a requirement.146  
 
RBS WorldPay also has to contend with a federal district court action filed in the northern District 
of Georgia seeking class action status and alleging a violation of Georgia’s data breach notification 
statute.147 In addition, Wackenhut Corporation, the security company, is contending with a suit filed in 
2008 in Tennessee Circuit Court alleging that it failed to notify consumers of a data breach as required by 
state law.148  
 
The Indiana Attorney General's Office recently resolved suits brought with the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services' Office of Civil Rights against two pharmacy chains, CVS149 and 
Walgreens,150 that involved data breach complaints alleging that customers' medical information was 
improperly discarded in trash bins outside of the stores.  The actions, however, were brought under 
HIPAA, not the Indiana data breach notification statute. 
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  http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2007/apr/apr26a_07.html 
145
  Sansom v. Heartland Payment Systems, Inc., 2009 WL 217497, *217497+ (Trial Pleading) (D.N.J. Jan 23, 
2009) Class Action Complaint (No. 33AV00001). 
146
  Amburgy, v. Express Scripts, Inc., 2009 WL 1344547, *1344547 (E.D.Mo. May 08, 2009) Class Action 
Complaint (No. 09705). 
147
  Irwin, v. RBS WorldPay, Inc., 2009 WL 412516, *412516 (Trial Pleading) (N.D.Ga. Feb 05, 2009) First 
Amended Class Action Complaint (No. 109-CV-0033). 
148
  Throckmorton v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, et al. 2008 WL 227312, *227312+ (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Jan 04, 
2008) Verified Complaint (No. 08C43). 
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  http://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/press/CVSSettlement20090710.pdf 
150
  http://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/press/WalgreensSettlement20090710.pdf 
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The rise of complaints alleging violations of data breach notification statutes – both by state 
attorneys general and by private litigants in federal court – should be a wake up call for lawyers and their 
clients.  As the incidence of reported data breaches increases, along with the number of complaints that 
companies have failed to comply with the requirements under the statute, liability – in terms of penalties 
and judgments -- will rise as well.  Statutes in 24 states incorporate provisions that allow companies to 
take “any measures necessary to determine the presence, nature, and scope of the breach and restore 
the reasonable integrity of the system;”151 any time limits are tolled while the company is under taking 
such an investigation.  Seven states also require companies to undertake a “reasonable” investigation to 
undertake the scope of the breach. 152  Accordingly, when companies face a data breach—and the 
prospect of litigation—it would be in their best interest to consider the stakes at risk and how they will 
approach such an investigation.  
   
V. Recommendations: Toward a Federal Data Breach Notification Standard 
A. Data Breach Notification Statute for HIPAA-Covered Entities  
 
The 2009 economic stimulus legislation includes requirements that “covered entities” as defined 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) provide notices to consumers of 
any breaches in the security of their protected health information (PHI).  “Business associates” of HIPAA-
covered entities will also be required to report such breaches to covered entities.153 
 
Congress uses a hybrid approach in its notification requirement, defining “breach” as "the 
unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information which compromises 
the security or privacy of such information, except where an unauthorized person to whom such 
information is disclosed would not reasonably have been able to retain such information."  §13400(1)(A).  
There is an another exception for certain circumstances involving inadvertent acquisition, access, or use 
                                                 
151
  See supra Section III.B.  
152
  See supra Section III.B.  
153
   H.R. 1 (111th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 17, 2009)  at §13402(a) & (b). 
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of PHI by employees and agents of covered entities or business associates where the information is not 
further acquired, accessed, used, or disclosed. 154 
 
The notification of breach provisions apply to PHI that is "unsecured."  The legislation leaves the 
definition of “unsecured” to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to address within 180 days of 
the statute’s passage in February 2009, that is by August 2009.  The provisional standard included by the 
statute, however, defines “unsecured” information as: 
[p]rotected health information that is not secured by a technology standard that renders protected 
health information unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals and is 
developed or endorsed by a standards developing organization that is accredited by the 
American National Standards Institute.155  
 
Congress’ enactment of a federal data breach notification requirement for PHI is an important first 
step toward a rationalization of data security standards.  Congress should now take the next step and 
enact a statute that applies to consumers’ PII, as defined by California’s statute, and incorporating a risk 
assessment approach to data breach notifications rather than strict liability.  The hair trigger set in the 
strict liability models has caused so many disclosure letters to be sent to so many consumers—with 
consumers often receiving letters from multiple companies regarding the same breach—that people have 
become numb to the effect.156 The form letters generally provide consumers with no information about 
any genuine injury or risk nor do they provide the consumers with the ability to judge whether there is any 
likelihood of injury or risk.  
 
 Instead, Congress should enact a statute that provides that notification is not required if, after an 
appropriate investigation, and after consultation with relevant federal, state, or local agencies responsible 
for law enforcement, the company determines that there is no reasonable likelihood of financial harm to 
the consumers whose personal information has been acquired as a result of the breach.  The company 
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  H.R. 1 (111th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 17, 2009)  at §13402(a) & (b).§13400(1)(B) 
155
  H.R. 1 (111th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 17, 2009)  at §13402(h)(1)(B).  
156
  See Schwartz and Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 913 Mich.  L. Rev. 916 (2007) (arguing 
for determination of data security breaches and post-notification remediation by an independent third party).  
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should be required to document the results of its investigation and retain those records for at least five 
years, with a fine of $50,000 for failure to maintain those records.  
B. Waiting for Godot:157 Steps for State Legislatures, Enforcement Agencies, and 
Companies  
 
An overarching federal data breach notification standard may not happen soon. In the meantime, 
there are a number of steps that state and local legislatures and enforcement agencies can take. First, 
the five states that do not have data breach notification statutes—Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, New 
Mexico, and South Dakota—should enact them immediately.  As laid out above, the most efficient, 
consumer-oriented approach is a statute that encompasses a risk-assessment definition of “data breach.” 
 
Second, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors should determine if the statutes in their 
jurisdictions have “reasonable investigation” and cooperation provisions that toll notification to consumers.  
If so, these agencies should ensure that companies are aware of these provisions and work toward taking 
full advantage of the ability to find out about breaches as early as possible.  
 
Third, data breach statutes throughout the country present a web of conflicting obligations for 
companies and their lawyers that may potentially expose organizations to millions of dollars in fines and 
civil liability if obligations under the laws are ignored or misunderstood.  A unified data breach notification 
statute – either a model state law  or a federal statute – will minimize the burden on the private sector. 
Companies with a multi-state or Internet presence currently must adhere to the most restrictive law or 
wrestle with conflict between the jurisdictions where it does business.  Many, if not most, of the state 
statutes allow companies to forego notifying individuals whose personal information may have been 
compromised if the company “reasonably” determines that the breach did not and likely will not result in 
harm to those individuals.  Although the statutes do not provide detail on what steps satisfy the 
requirements for a “reasonable” investigation,” most do require the companies to document what steps 
they have taken and to maintain the records for a set period of time.  Companies that undertake a 
“reasonable investigation” face extraordinarily high stakes in terms of potential fines and risk to reputation 
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and should consider whether to rely on untrained personnel or individuals with potential conflicts of 
interest to investigate the origin, nature, and extent of the breach, and to provide a determination as to 
whether the breach resulted in harm to individuals whose personal information has been compromised. 
  
Enactment of a federal data breach notification statute can provide enforcement authority to state 
attorneys general and a federal law enforcement authority, such as the U.S. Department of Justice or the 
Federal Trade Commission.  This model has worked well with the Telemarketing Sales Rule158 and the 
rule regulating the “pay-per-call” industry159, which provide such authority to both the federal government 
and the states, which typically have the most experience combating such problems. Ultimately, the 
private sector and consumers will benefit from a unified data breach notification law as well as multiple 
enforcers of that law.  
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